Misc RM 51    Misc reference material

Reference Material - For Information Only!


Over time we have collected a lot of reference material.

We figured it would be better to share with all rather than just delete it.

If you want it, keep it, otherwise just delete it. 

Due to the volume it will take more than one mailing.




TAXATION - A 3-Legged Stool
A 3-legged stool will not stand if any one of the legs is missing.  The Tax Stool must have all 3 legs:

     1. There must be a subject of the tax: it must be imposed upon some "thing" or some "activity".
     2. Someone must be made liable for the tax; it could be a human being or an artificial entity, such as a corporation.
     3. There must be a law that makes it a crime not to pay the tax and imposes a penalty upon the party made liable for payment.

At a minimum, a taxing statute which describes the service, transaction, or object of a tax must be in evidence (United States v. Community TV, Inc. 327 F.2d 797, at p. 800 (1964); Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858), and to establish criminal liability, there must be three components in place: (1) the taxing statute which describes the service, transaction, or object of tax, (2) the statute which determines liability, and (3) the statute which determines the crime
(United States of America v. Menk, 260 F.Supp. 784 (1966), at p. 787);




All Crime is Commercial

27 CFR 72.11

MEANING OF TERMS:  As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires, terms shall have the meanings ascribed in this section.  Words in the plural form shall include the singular, and vice versa, and words importing the masculine gender shall include the feminine.  The terms "includes" and "including" do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class.

COMMERCIAL CRIMES:  Any of the following types of crimes (FEDERAL OR STATE):  Offenses against the revenue laws; burglary; counterfeiting; forgery; kidnapping; larceny; robbery; illegal sale or possession of deadly weapons; prostitution (including soliciting, procuring, pandering, white slaving, keeping house of ill fame, and like offenses); extortion; swindling and confidence games; and attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or compounding any of the foregoing crimes.  Addiction to narcotic drugs and use of marijuana will be treated as if such were commercial crime."




Officer must identify himself and show you ID if you request it. Also, officer cannot swear an oath in his own mind -he has to swear to the complaint in front of a proper party to attest to the swearing. I.e. signing a ticket and giving it to you on the street doesn't get it anymore.
City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa vs Atsinger , 617 NW 2d 272, 9-7-2000. Iowa
Supreme Court.

M.C.L.A. 764.19
Current through P.A. 1995, Nos. 1to 3, 5 to 8, 10 to 24, 26, 58, and 61to 100
764.19. Arrest without warrant; duty of officer, return as evidence

Sec. 19. When arresting a person, without a warrant, the officer making the arrest shall inform the person arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, except when the person arrested is engaged in the commission of a criminal offense, or if he flees or if he forcibly resists arrest before the officer has time to inform him.  The return of the officer making the arrest, endorsed upon the warrant upon which the accused person shall be subsequently held, affirming compliance with the provisions herein, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact in the trial of any criminal cause.

Officer, in making an arrest, should have informed the one to be arrested of facts or offense for which he was arrested. 
Drennan v. People (1862) 10 Mich. 169.





Title 5 USC §556(d) states as follows: "When jurisdiction is challenged the burden of proof is on the government."

"No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction." –  Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S. Ct. 768

"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be 'assumed', it must be proved to exist!"

Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca2d 751. 211 P2s 389

"Jurisdiction once challenged cannot be assumed and must be decided." 

Maine v. Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 2502

"...Federal jurisdiction cannot be assumed, but must be clearly shown."   Brooks v. Yawkey 200 F. 2d. 633

The Following cases also substantiate that it is a Fact of law that the person asserting jurisdiction must, when challenged, PROVE that jurisdiction exists: McNutt v. G.M., 56 S. Ct. 789, 80 L. Ed. 1135; Griffin v. Mattews, 310 Supp. 341, 423, F. 2d 272; Basso v. U.P.L., 495 F. 2d 906; Thomson v. Gaskiel, 62 S. Ct. 673, 83 L. Ed. 111; Albrect v. U.S., 273 U.S. 1

"Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies and where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity..." 

City Street Improv. Co. v. Pearson 181 C 640, 185 P. 962

O'Neill v. Dept. of Professional & Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 393, 46 P2d 234.

"The law requires PROOF OF JURISDICTION to appear on the Record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings."   Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533



This is just one of MANY rulings where the Federal courts have consistently, repeatedly, ruled that payment for labor (wages, salaries and compensation for personal services) is NOT taxable!



The Federal Courts say WAGES are NOT TAXABLE!

 "... whatever may constitute income, therefore, must have the essential feature of gain to the recipient. This was true when the 16th Amendment became effective, it was true at the time of Eisner v. Macomber Supra, it was true under Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1938, and it is likewise true under Section 61(a) of the I.R.S. Code of 1954. If there is not gain, there is not income ... Congress has taxed income not compensation."

[Conner v. U.S., 303 F Supp. 1187 (1969)] 



"Income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment and the Revenue Act means, gain ... and, in such connection, gain means profit ... proceeding from property severed from capital, however invested

or employed and coming in, received or drawn by the taxpayer for his separate use, benefit and disposal."

- [Staples v. U.S., 21 F Supp 737 U.S. Dist. Ct. ED PA, 1937] -


"There is a clear distinction between `profit' and `wages', or a compensation for labor. Compensation for labor (wages) cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word `profit', as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment -- a different thing altogether from the mere compensation for labor."

- [Oliver v. Halstead, 86 S.E. Rep 2nd 85e9 (1955)] -


"The claim that salaries, wages, and compensation for personal services are to be taxed as an entirety and therefore must be returned by the individual who has performed the services which produce the gain is without support, either in the language of the Act or in the decisions of the courts construing it. Not

only this, but it is directly opposed to provisions of the Act and to regulations of the U.S. Treasury Department, which either prescribed or permits that compensations for personal services not be taxed as a entirety and not be returned by the individual performing the services. It is to be noted that, by

the language of the Act, it is not salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services that are to be included in gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services."

- [Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)] -


A much earlier ruling stated very simply: "... one does not derive income by rendering services and

charging for them."

- [Edwards v. Keith, 231 F 111 (1916)] -


State court rulings coincide with the Federal courts. "... reasonable compensation for labor or services rendered is not profit."

- [Lauderdale Cemetary Assoc. v. Mathews, 345 PA 239; 47 A. 2d 277, 280 (1946)] -


"There is a clear distinction between profit and wages, or compensation for labor. Compensation for labor cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law."

- [Oliver v. Halstead, 196 VA 992; 86 S.E. 2d 858 (1955)] -



Jack Cole Company v. MacFarland, 337 SW2d 453, Tenn. 1960

P. 454 Legislature can name any privilege a taxable privilege and tax it by means other than an income tax, but the legislature cannot name something to be a taxable privilege unless it is first a privilege.

Right to receive income or earnings is right belonging to every person, and realization and receipt of income is therefore not a "privilege" that can be taxed.

P 455...If the income tax is a privilege tax, the authority to tax incomes upon prescribed conditions makes of the clause an exception to the unconditional and unlimited authority to tax privileges generally.

[1] It cannot be denied that the Legislature can name any privilege a taxable privilege and tax it my means other than an income tax, but the Legislature cannot name something to be a taxable privilege unless it is first a privilege.

[3] Realizing and receiving income or earnings is not a privilege that can be taxed. "A privilege is whatever business, pursuit, occupation, or vocation, affecting the public, the Legislature chooses to declare and tax as such." Corn et al. v. Fort, 179 Tenn. 377, 95 SW2d 620, 623, 106 A.L.R. 647. "Privileges are special rights, belonging to the individual or class, and not to the mass; properly, an exemption from some general burden, obligation or duty; a right peculiar to some individual or body." Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 307.

Since the right to receive income or earnings is a right belonging to every person, this right cannot be taxed as a privilege.




FOIA's for the IRS



The Internal Revenue Manual says that the Form 2162 (Assessment Certificate) ".is the legal document that permits collection activity." This FOIA will get you certified proof, that you can use in court if need be, that no Form 2162 was filled out and signed by the assessment officer.  Once you have proof of no Form 2162 you can easily rebut the presumption of administrative regularity with proof provided by them, and, if you feel like litigating, lay the ground work for a suit for unlawful tax collection activities using their own proof.



IRS manuals for 2001 shows that the 23c is still the current form in use with the service.  In court, the IRS has been trying to slippy slide around the requirements for a 23c by using the "006RACS report" or a "4340 Form."  They've been doing the same with FOIA's for the same. Why?  Probably because they don't have a valid 23c!  This FOIA boxes 'em in with exhibits and makes it perfectly clear that you will settle for nothing less than the probably non-existent 23c.  Again, this FOIA will get you a "certificate of official record" that you can use in court. Note:  Only send this request when you have received some sort of a bill from the IRS.  If you've been filing you've been assessing yourself.



Get the names and employee numbers of all the assessment officers that worked at the service center in your area for the years that interest you.  Do they want to give that to you?  No!  Do they have to?  Yes!

What fun!



Get the Form 5734 Non-Master file assessment voucher.  In order to have a valid assessment and to be able to assess you for penalties or interest the form must be filled and sent to you when you request it. Do they have it?  Probably not!



Interesting case cites on the right to criticize government

Since the day the ink dried on the Bill of Rights, "[t]he right of an American citizen to criticize public officials and policies . . . is 'the central meaning of the First Amendment.'" Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)). There can be no doubt that the freedom to express disagreement with state action, without fear of reprisal based on the expression, is unequivocally among the protections provided by the First Amendment. See id.; Bloch, 156 F.3d at 682; see also Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 264 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he First Amendment right to criticize public officials is well-established and supported by ample case law. Furthermore, it is well-established that a public official's retaliation against an individual exercising his or her First Amendment rights is a violation of ' 1983."); Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[G]overnment officials in general, and police officers in particular, may not exercise their authority for personal motives, particularly in response to real or perceived slights to their dignity. Surely, anyone who takes an oath of office knows - or should know - that much.")."    McCurdy v Montgomery County, Ohio, 240 F3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001)



Only aliens applying for permanent residency are required to make application for a social security account number in order to work in the United States, reference 42 USC 405(c)(2)(B)(i)(I).  Under federal law, a citizen is not required to make application for a social security number unless he desires to participate in National Socialism, reference sub paragraph (II) of the above mandate by Congress.  Congress has no authority to compel citizens to participate in National Socialism, reference

RailRoad Retirement Bd.  v.  Alton RR Co.  (1935)



"The terms `excise' and `privilege' tax are synonymous."  (American Airways vs. Wallace, 57 F 2d 877, 800)


"Congress may not, under the taxing power, assert a power not delegated to it by the constitution."

(Regal Drug Co. vs. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386; 67 L ED 318; 43 S. Ct. 152)


"The Secretary of the Treasury cannot by his regulation alter or amend a Revenue Law."

(Morrill vs. Jones 106 U.S. 407)


In Evans vs. Gore (1920) the court ruled: "The sixteenth does not justify the taxation of persons or things (their property) previously immune . . . it does not extend taxing power to new or excepted citizens . . . it is intended only to remove all occasions from any apportionment of income taxes among the states. It does not authorize a tax on a salary."


"The tax is, of course an excise tax, as are all taxes on income . . ."

(White Packing Co. vs. Robertson, 89 F 2d 775, 779 the 4th Circuit Court)


"The income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It is an excise tax . . ."

(Congressional Record, March 27, 1943)


In 1916, the Supreme Court verified the income tax is not a "Direct Tax." In Brushaber vs. Union Pacific the court declared: "The contention that the Amendment (16th) treats a tax as a direct tax (which must be apportioned) is wholly without foundation . . . The Amendment was drawn with the object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution."


"The tax imposed . . . being a direct tax is unconstitutional and void because [it was] not apportioned . . . constituting one entire scheme . . . The Constitution divided federal taxation into two great classes - the class of direct taxes, and that of [indirect taxes] duties, imposts and excises - and the prescribed two rules which qualified the grant of power as to each class." (Pollock vs. Farmers Loan and Trust, 158 U.S. 601)


In 1930, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Brushaber and Pollock cases in Tyler vs. U.S.: "A tax laid upon the happening of an event, as distinguished from its tangible fruits (of our labor), is an indirect tax."


"Income means 1909's excise tax." (Merchants vs. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509)


"Income means 1909's excise and privilege tax." (Bowers vs. Kerbaugh, 271 U.S. 170)


In a report titled "Some Constitutional Questions regarding Federal Income Tax Law" prepared by Howard Zaritsky, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress # 84188A 784-275, states, "The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice White noted that the 16th Amendment did not authorize any new type of tax, did not repeal or revoke the tax clauses of Article I of the Constitution. Direct taxes are still subject to the rule of apportionment and indirect taxes are still subject to the rule of uniformity."


"The citizen is exempt from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language." (Spreckels Sugar Fer. Co. vs. Mclain, 24Sct 382, 1904)


In a letter from Mark Forman, Legislative Correspondent for Senator Daniel Inouye dated June 26, 1989, he states, "Based on the research performed by the Congressional Research Service, there is no provision which specifically and unequivocally requires an individual to pay income taxes."


"The general term income is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code [Title 26]."

(U.S. vs. Ballard, 400F2d404, 1976)


Where is the clear and equivocal language if income is not defined, or there are no provision that unequivocally requires an individual to pay income taxes?


In Stanton vs. Baltic Mining Co., 36 S. Ct. 281, 1916, the court ruled: ". . . the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation."


Simply put, the so-called income tax is another GIANT HOAX that has been perpetrated on the unsuspecting sleeping tax-payers by the MONEY-CHANGERS! While the judges who are paid by the wolves are aiding and abetting the crime.


Jim Davidson, National Taxpayers Union said, "The politicians don't just want your money. They want your soul. They want you to be worn down by taxes until you are dependent and hopeless."





You have a right to own and contract your labor as you see fit. Baily v. Alabama, 219 US 219

"Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and takes on the character of a mere private citizen [where private corporate commercial paper {Federal Reserve Notes} are concerned].... For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as an entity entirely separate from government." {This Emphasis added} Clearfield Trust Company v. United States,318 US 363 Bank of United States v. Planters Bank, 9 Wheaton (22 US) 904, 6 L. Ed. 24

"Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct... If this is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately" U.S. v. Twell, 550 F2d 297, 299-300 (1977)

"Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the existence of facts in question, and the estoppel by misrepresentation. When silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the silent party to deny what his silence has induced the other party to believe and act upon, it will operate as an estoppel. Carmine v. Bower, 64 A. 932

"Because of what appears to be a lawful command on the surface, many citizens, because of their respect for what only appears to be a law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights, due to ignorance." (Paraphrased) U.S. V Minker, 350 US 179, at page 187

That is, an 'inhabitant' or 'resident' is a person coming into a place with an intention to establish his domicile, or permanent residence; and in consequence actually resides; under this intention he takes a house or lodging as one fixed and stationary, and opens a store or takes any step preparatory to business, or any execution of this settled intention. The time is not so essential as the intent executed, by making or beginning the actual establishment." "The only reason, I believe, that a free man is bound by human law, is,
that he binds himself." Chisom v Georgia, 2 US (Dall) 419, 455, U.S. Supreme Court (1794)

The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared." Perry v United States, 294 U.S. 330. 353 (1935).

"Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.

Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal--would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face."
--Mr. Justice Brandies of the U.S. Supreme Court - dissent passage - Olmstead V. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)

"Anyone entering into an arrangement with the government takes a risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the government stays within the bounds of his authority, even though the agent himself may be unaware of the limitations upon his authority." Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. A.A. Merrill , 332 U.S. 380, U.S.  Supreme Court

"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326





ESTATE OF COWART v. NICKLOS DRILLING CO., 505 U.S. 469 (1992) In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 US 184, 190 (1991).

The controlling principle in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written. The principle can at times come into some tension with another fundamental principle of our law, one requiring judicial deference to a reasonable statutory interpretation by an administering agency.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (1984); National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., (1992).

Of course, a reviewing court should not defer to an agency position which is contrary to an intent of Congress expressed in unambiguous terms.
K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., (1988); Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 842-843.

In any event, canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute, a court should always turn first to one cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a [503 U.S. 249, 254] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.
See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., -242 (1989); United States v. Goldenberg, -103 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 6 Cranch 53, 68.

When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: "judicial inquiry is complete."
 Rubin v. United States, (1981); see also Ron Pair Enterprises, supra, at 241.

ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO. No. 95-1376. Argued November 6, 1996  Decided February 18, 1997 Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.

Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and "the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent."
United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 US 235, 240 (1989); see also Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 US 249, 253-254 (1992).




Two-cent postage
The law cite:  12 Stat 701, CHAP. LXXI:

CHAP. LXXI.--An Act to amend the Laws relating to the Post-Office Department.

   Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Postmaster-General shall have the power to appoint and commission all postmasters whose salary or compensation for the preceding fiscal year shall at the time of such appointment have been ascertained to be less than one thousand dollars per year; and in all other cases the President shall appoint. The person appointed postmaster shall reside within the delivery of the office to which he shall be appointed.
[at 12 Stat. 705] SEC. 23. And be it further enacted, That the rate of postage on all letters not transmitted through the mails of the United States, but delivered through the post-office or its carriers, commonly described as local or drop letters, and not exceeding one half ounce in weight, shall be uniform at two cents, and an additional rate for each half ounce or fraction thereof of additional weight, to be in all cases prepaid by postage stamps affixed to the envelope of such letter, but no extra postage or carrier's fee shall hereafter be charged or collected upon letters delivered by carriers, nor upon letters collected by them for mailing or for delivery.


Comment: I went to the local office of the UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE and requested an International mail, return receipt requested card. It is PS Form 2865 and MAGICALLY it is delivered by POSTAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA! SAYS SO, RIGHT ON THE CARD.





Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)-cannot search car in routine traffic stop!





No. 97—7597. Argued November 3, 1998–Decided December 8, 1998

An Iowa policeman stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding and issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, without either Knowles' consent or probable cause, found marijuana and a "pot pipe," and arrested Knowles. Before his trial on state drug charges, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that because he had not been arrested, the search could not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218. The trial court denied the motion and found Knowles guilty, based on state law giving officers authority to conduct a full-blown search of an automobile and driver where they issue a citation instead of making a custodial arrest. In affirming, the State Supreme Court applied its bright-line "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as the officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been an arrest.

Held:  The search at issue, authorized as it was by state law, nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment. Neither of the two historical exceptions for the "search incident to arrest" exception, see Robinson, supra, at 234, is sufficient to justify the search in the present case. First, the threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. While concern for safety during a routine traffic stop may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. Second, the need to discover and preserve evidence does not exist in a traffic stop, for once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. Iowa's argument that a "search incident to citation" is justified because a suspect may try to hide evidence of his identity or of other crimes is unpersuasive. An officer may arrest a driver if he is not satisfied with the identification furnished, and the possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence of an unrelated offense seems remote. Pp. 3—6.

569 N. W. 2d 601, reversed and remanded.

    Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.





Income taxes are voluntary gifts; a voluntary, direct gift!


Title 31 United States Code § 321 (d) (1&2) states:



(1) The Secretary of the Treasury may accept, hold, administer, and use gifts and bequests of property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Department of the Treasury. Gifts and bequests of money and the proceeds from sales of other property received as gifts or bequests shall be deposited in the Treasury in a separate fund and shall be disbursed on order of the Secretary of the Treasury. Property accepted under this paragraph, and the proceeds thereof, shall be used as nearly as possible in accordance with the terms of the gift or bequest. 


(2) For purposes of the Federal income [tax], estate[tax], and gift taxes, property accepted under paragraph (1) shall be considered as a gift or bequest to or for the use of the United States." [added for clarity]




Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)



Judges as Criminals


The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a criminal enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985).

The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged the judicial corruption in Cook County, when it stated that Judge "Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through 'Operation Greylord', a labyrinthine federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago". Bracey v. Gramley, case No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997).

Since judges who do not report the criminal activities of other judges become principals in the criminal activity, 18 U.S.C. Section 2, 3 & 4, and since no judges have reported the criminal activity of the judges who have been convicted, the other judges are as guilty as the convicted judges.

The criminal activities that the Federal Courts found in the Circuit Court of Cook County still exist, and are today under the care, custody and control of Judge Greylord II (Chief Judge Donald O'Connell). The Circuit Court of Cook County remains a criminal enterprise.



Public Licenses and Private Rights, 33 Oregon Law Review 1 (Barnett, 1953)

Because of the rapidly increasing application of the license system to more and more activities by the Federal, state, and local governments, the further consideration of the relation of public licenses to private rights becomes more and more important. The popular understanding of the word "license" [required by government for the performance of various activities] undoubtedly is a permission to do something which, without the license, would not be allowable. The object of the license is to confer a right that does not exist without the license. Standard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 75, 82 S.W. 1020, 1021 (1904); Hackett v. Wilson, 12 Or. 25, 37, 6 Pac. 652 (1885), Reser v. Umatilla Co, 48 Or. 326, 327, 86 Pac. 595 (1906); State v. Martin, 180 Or. 459, 474, 176 P.2d 636, 643 (1947); [33 Or. L. Rev. 3, Fn. 2].

But, in fact, there is no grant of "privilege" (benefaction) of any kind whatever in a public license. Courts sometimes see this, and sometimes they do not; and so the law has become greatly confused. It will be apparent that principles applicable to public licenses (malefactions) have been confused with those applicable to private licenses (benefactions), largely because the two unrelated concepts have the same name; and that a false analogy of "licenses" (malefactions) to true "privileges" (benefactions) granted by the governments has probably made more mischief in this connection. But these two concepts of privilege have no relation whatever to that of a public "license." [33 Or. L. Rev. 3-4].

A license is merely a permission to do what is unlawful at common law, or is made so by some statute or ordinance, including the one authorizing or requiring the license. The Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 701, 703 (D. Or. 1885); [33 Or. L. Rev. 3, Fn. 2].

And so courts have, in this connection, distinguished "licensed" vocations from vocations "lawful per se." U.S. v. McFarland, 28 App. D.C. 552, 568 (1907); Peginis v. Atlanta, 132 Ga. 302, 63 S.E. 857, 858 (1909); [33 Or. L. Rev. 3, Fn. 3].

A license is "a personal privilege,...conveys no estate or interest, and is revocable at the pleasure of the party making it." De Haro v. U.S., 5 Wall. 599, 627 (U.S. 1866); [33 Or. L. Rev. 3, Fn. 5].

"One-half of the doubts in life arise from the defects of language, and if this instrument had been called an exemption, instead of a license, it would have given a better ideal of its character. Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts ..." Johnson, J., concurring, Gibson v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 222, 232 (U.S. 1824). See also Creighton & Smart, Introductory Logic 79 (5th ed. 1946); Cohen and Nagel, Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method 17 (1947). [33 Or. L. Rev. 3, Fn. 6].,

The distinction between a true "privilege" and a "right" ("vested right") is historical rather than logical. "Frequently a force of history is felt in the distinction between the citizen's rights and a favor accorded to him by government. It is the difference between taking something away from one who has always had it and giving someone something he has no right to demand. To a large degree what one 'has' which may be 'taken away' is an accident of history.." Hale, Hearings: The Right to a Trial, with Special Reference to Administrative Powers, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 749, 775 (1948). So the term "right" or "vested right" itself "indicates little beyond the ideal of inviolability." Freund, Police Power 602 (1909). [33 Or.L.Rev. 4, Fn. 7].

It is thus very clear then that "the requirement of a license is not intended as a privilege, but as a common restraint" ---and a restraint upon activities authorized by the common law. But, as has been said, "a license law ... assumes the illegality of the business, and denounces penalties upon those who pursue it without previously protecting themselves by procuring a license." State v. Parker Distilling Co., 236 Mo. 219, 139 S.W. 453, 462 (1911); [33 Or. L. Rev. 4, Fn. 11].

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. The purpose of it is to regulate and control the manner in which the business is conducted, and prevent its being carried on in such a way as to ignore the public interest. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha, 13 F.2d 500, 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1926); [33 Or. L. Rev. 5, Fn. 13].

The form of licensing to be considered here is the administrative lifting of a legislative prohibition. The primary legislative thought in licensing is not prohibition but regulation, to be made effective by the formal general denial of a right which is then made individually available by an administrative act of approval, certification, consent or permit. Freund, Licensing, 5 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 447 (1933); [33 Or. L. Rev. 5, Fn. 13].

That is just why licenses are required --- to restrict the liberty in activities already existing at common law. [33 Or. L. Rev. 5-6].

The "liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution "must be interpreted in light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution." [U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898)]. This liberty denotes the "right of the individual ... to engage in any of the common occupations of life ... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the ordinary pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399; [33 Or. L. Rev. 6, Fn. 19].

Hutcheson, The Common Law of the Constitution, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 317 (1937); Barnett, Vested Rights in the Common Law, 27 Or. L. Rev. 25 (1947); [33 Or. L. Rev. 6, Fn. 21]. Power of State to Restrict One's Right to Engage in Lawful Occupation, 25 Va. L. Rev. 219 (1938); [33 Or. L. Rev. 6, Fn. 22].

The opportunity to become a citizen of the United States is said to be merely a privilege and not a right. Tutun v. U.S., 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926). [33 Or. L. Rev. 7, Fn. 24].

It has been stated that "numerous authorities ... hold that a license is not within the protection of the Constitution." [Fn. 25 citing, State v. Cote, 122 Me. 452, 120 Atl. 538 (1923)]. However, if some Constitutional protection may be denied, there is no good reason in logic why all may not be denied. Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n., 271 U.S. 583, 593-594 (1926). [33 Or. L. Rev. 8, Fn. 26].

It is an essential ingredient of a legal license, that it confers no right, or estate, or vested interest, but is at all times revocable at the pleasure of the party that grants it ... [33 Or. L. Rev. 8, Fn. 28].

Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 176 (1928); [33 Or. L. Rev. 9, Fn. 30].

It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, supra, at 593-594 (1926); [33 Or. L. Rev. 10, Fn. 32].

"...the acceptance of a license, in whatever form, will not impose upon the licensee an obligation to respect or to comply with any provisions of the statute or the regulations proscribed ... that are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States." Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452, 468 (1901); [33 Or. L. Rev. 10, Fn. 33].

Being a privilege, it [a motor vehicle license] can be given or withheld... As a general rule, the state having the power to deny a privilege altogether may grant it upon conditions, not requiring relinquishment of constitutional rights, as it sees fit to impose....A constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to obtain an unconstitutional result. McIntyre v. Harrison, 72 Ga. 65, 157 S.E. 499, 506-507 (1931); [33 Or. L. Rev. 11, Fn. 34].

If the wayward courts had only realized that a "license" is not a grant of a new "privilege," but, on the contrary, a restriction on a "right" already existing, all this absurd confusion, with resulting deprivation of constitutional protections, would have been avoided. [33 Or. L. Rev. 15].

N.B. Citizens Savings and Loan v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 455, 461, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)  
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/87/655.html ;
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884)  
(It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the state.);
Cf. Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277 (1908)  
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/208/161.html ;
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394 (1923)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/261/525.html ;
Taxing the Exercise of Natural Rights, Harvard Legal Essays (Maguire, 273, 322 (1934)); and that class of Authority, infra.

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