Misc RM 45 Misc reference material Part 2
Reference Material - For Information Only!
Over time we have collected a lot of reference material.
We figured it would be better to share with all rather than just delete it.
If you want it, keep it, otherwise just delete it.
Due to the volume it will take more than one mailing.
Headings
Only Statutes Included in DMV Letter no Regulations of Accuser
Is a "Driver License" Required under CAS 28.15.011? There is no Regulation!
Who are the "Police Officers" in the State Agencies in the AAC Regulations?
Citations on DMV Letter are NOT Regulations Therefore Void!
Regulations for CAS 12.25 et seq. on Arrest and Citations
Assistance of Counsel is a Criminal Rule (Regulation) by SCO ONLY!
Court or Employee of a Court is a "criminal justice agency" and is an "agency"!
"Criminal Justice Activity" (Regulation) is Investigation, Prosecution, and Adjudication
Criminal Rule (Regulation) 16 Protects the Administrative State
What is Treason and Levying War?
Do the Actions of the Police Officers and other Constitute Levying War and Treason
Attempts to Obtain copies of the Original Citations, If they do Exist.
Creating Rights to Bypass the Courts of Law
Law of the Land
Beverly W. Cutler Admits to Being an Administrative Judge
Only Statutes Included in DMV Letter no Regulations of Accuser
The only statutes included the in the DMV Letter were "AS 28.05.121 28.05.141" and no regulations were included. No Notice of any type has been received from DMV prior to the DMV Letter by Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd, and of course the DMV letter does no comply with CAS 44.62.360, i.e., no regulation(s), can't understand, and no signature.
Under CAS 44.62.360 clearly states that whether a right, authority, license, or privilege should be revoked, suspended, limited, or conditioned initiated by the accuser must be written in concise so that the respondent can understand and prepare a defense, the specific statute and regulation that the respondent is to have violated not in the language of the statue and regulation, and it must be verified unless by a public officer (they do no exist in Alaska) or by an employee of an agency.
Is a "Driver License" Required under CAS 28.15.011? There is no Regulation!
Under the APA (Alaska) in the statute © AS 28.15.011 under the Title of "Drivers must be licensed", to be valid under the APA 44.62 et seq.; and in particular CAS 44.62.040 (Submitting Regulations), CAS 44.62.360 (Accusation), and CAS 44.62.370 (Statement of Issues) there must be regulation, i.e. substantive regulation to have the force and effect of law.
Under CAS 44.62.040(b), all state agencies must cite the general statutory authority under which a regulation is adopted as well as the citation of the specific statutory section being implemented, interpreted, or made clear with exceptions.
Upon an intensive search of the AAC's and word searching in WestLaw, a company that provides public records and documents under contract on the Internet, there is no regulation of any type, be it a substantive regulation, interpretative, or administrative for CAS 28.15.011!
This is an estoppel to DMV, the STATE OF ALASKA, all law enforcement agencies, and all state agencies (sic) of my "private rights" including, but not limited to the right to travel, right of due process, right of Assistance of Counsel, right to own property, and the right to life, liberty and the pursuate of happiness versus the "private rights" of the Administrative State. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia and impotentia excusat legem. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295, 296, 301-303 (1979), Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998), State of Ohio DHS v. U.S. DHHS, 862 F.2d 1228, 1237 (1988), and Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 908, 909 (Alaska - 1971).
Who are the "Police Officers" in the State Agencies in the AAC Regulations?
Under 13 AAC 40.010, we find that a police officer is authorized to only issue a citation for violations of traffic regulations, to wit:
ALASKA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 13. PUBLIC SAFETY PART 1. DIVISION OF ALASKA STATE TROOPERS CHAPTER 40. GENERAL PROVISIONS Current through Register 170 (July 2004)
(36) "police officer" means a person authorized to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrest or issue a citation for violations of traffic regulations;
And under the APA (Alaska) if the ordinance is in fact a substantive regulation, then the particular copyrighted Alaska Statute must be identified.
Citations on DMV Letter are NOT Regulations Therefore Void!
Under the DMV Letter, is lists three citation numbers, to wit:
1. A1389591 of 6/17/2004
2. A1380225 of 2/24/2004
3. A1371054 of 1/3/2004
Police Officer Richard J. Dykstdra II, did purportedly issue Citation A1389591 on or about June 17, 2004 for AMC 9.26.030(c)-Z6 for greater than 20+ mph.
Under AMC 9.26.030 we find the following, to wit:
9.26.030 Alteration of maximum limits.
A. When as a result of a comprehensive speed study the traffic engineer determines that the maximum speed permitted under this chapter is greater or less than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions existing upon a public street or part thereof, the traffic engineer may declare a reasonable and safe maximum speed limit on it which:
1. Increases the limit, but not to more than 55 miles per hour or 90 kilometers per hour; or
2. Decreases the limit, but not to less than 20 miles per hour or 30 kilometers per hour.
B. A limit altered as authorized in this section is effective when an appropriate sign giving notice thereof is erected. The maximum speed limit may be declared effective at all times or at the times indicated upon the sign; and a different limit may be established for different times of day, different types of vehicles, varying weather conditions or other factors bearing on safe speed, which limits are effective when posted upon an appropriate sign.
C. It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle in excess of the speed limits established by signs lawfully erected by the traffic engineer or by the State of Alaska.
(CAC 9.26.030; AO No. 78-72; AO No. 78-146; AO No. 2003-73, § 5, 4-22-03) [Emphasis added]
According to the Charter of Anchorage, a municipal corporation, a possibility exists that said ordinance might be considered a regulation under the APA (Alaska) because of the following, to wit:
Section 10.02. Actions requiring an ordinance.
In addition to other actions which require an ordinance, the assembly shall use ordinances to:
(1) Adopt or amend the administrative code;
(2) Levy taxes;
(3) Authorize borrowing of money;
(4) Grant, renew or extend a franchise;
(5) Regulate the rate charged by a public utility;
(6) Provide for a fine or other penalty or establish a rule or regulation for the violation of which a fine or other penalty is imposed;
(7) Adopt or amend zoning or similar land use control measures;
(8) Convey or lease, or authorize the conveyance or lease, of any interest in lands of the municipality. An ordinance conveying an interest in real property dedicated to public park or recreational purposes is valid only upon approval by a majority of those voting on the question at a regular or special election. The assembly shall publish notice of the election, including a description of the property by proper place name and legal description, and the terms and conditions of the conveyance. [Emphasis added]
But under the Anchorage Municipal Ordinance ("AMC") the headings have no effect of the sections and Title 9 of the AMC's can be cited as the "Traffic Code", to wit:
9.02.010 Short title.
This title may be known and cited as the Traffic Code.
9.02.020 Effect of headings.
Chapter and section headings contained in this title shall not be deemed to govern, limit, modify or in any manner affect the scope, meaning or intent of the provisions of any chapter or section of this title. (CAC 9.02.020; AO No. 78-72)
Under the Traffic Code (Title 9) only has application to drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, the state, or any borough, town, district or any other political subdivision of the state, to wit:
9.08.060 Applicability of traffic regulations to public employees.
The provisions of this title shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, the state or any borough, town, district or any other political subdivision of the state, subject to the specific exemptions as are set forth in this title or in the state Vehicle Code. (CAC 9.08.060; AO No. 78-72)
Under the APA (Alaska) there must be a statute and regulation. So if the ordinances are in fact regulations, then each of these ordinances must have a specific AS identified or regulation if not.
In the AMC's we find a State Reference Table, and in this we find no specific AS authority for 9.26.030. There is a generic catchall cross reference of AS 28.01.010 for all of the Traffic Code (Title 9) and 38 other references to AS 28 et seq. for the Traffic Code ordinances. There is no AS for 9.08.060 or 9.26.030 that can be determined from the State Reference Table in the AMC's
In the AS in under CAS 28.01.010 it states Title AS 28 and the regulations adopted under AS 28 "[A]re applicable within all municipalities of the state." And further under CAS 28.01.010 it states that "A municipality may not incorporate into a publication of traffic ordinances a provision of this title or the regulations adopted under this title without specifically identifying the provision or regulation as a state statute or regulation.
In checking 9.26.030 of A1389591 to see if there is a specific state statute or regulation identified, none exists. In checking if 9.08.060 has a specific state statute or regulation identified, none exists.
It is self-evident that the Traffic Code 9.08.060 is only for the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, the state, or any borough, town, district or any other political subdivision of the state and no state statute authorizing a substantive regulation can exist, as the publics rights can not exist against my private rights. If 9.08.060 is not true, then all of the Traffic Code (Title 9) is Void, so therefore it is admitted that 9.08.060 is true!
There exists the possibility that CAS 28.10.181 is the statute under which 9.08.060 exists if in fact it is a regulation. There is only one AAC for CAS 28.10.181, and it is in 13 AAC 02.340 and has to do with handicapped license plates or permits. This is entirely consistent, as all government owned vehicles must be registered and that only the Traffic Code would have application to government employees.
It is not admitted that ordinances are in fact regulations, as this has to be specifically defined and determined by the true judiciary arising under a constitution in which the private rights are secured and the State has no rights except those granted under a limited delegation of Power from the people.
Regulations for CAS 12.25 et seq. on Arrest and Citations
Under CAS 12.25 et seq. there are no regulations to authorize any arrest with or without warrant. There are no regulations to authorize the issuing of citations, the making of the form for citations, or the disposition of citations. This is entirely consistent in that the police officers are in reality only professionals at making citizen's arrest (Wasilla's Regulations and Procedures) in which all liability rests with the person issuing the violations (CAS 11.81.900 - troopers), infractions (CAS 28.04.050), and in misdemeanor's crimes, the police officer is the private prosecutor.
There are regulations on Department of Corrections only under CAS 12.25 et seq. 22 AAC 05.545 is totally unconstitutional as only an "attorney" or an "agent employed by an attorney" can access a prisoner. A private party, a man/woman wanting to provide assistance, or a Counsellor-at-law arising under the 6th Amendment of the Bill of Rights is estopped from assisting, providing some form of assistance of counsel, or even providing papers and documents for signing.
Also in Alaska there are no "Attorneys and Counsellors-at-law" as the Board of Governors has no authority to certify anyone to do anything since 1976.
Criminal Rules (Regulations) have the "Force of Effect of Law" and take Precedence over the Criminal Procedure in the Alaska Statutes in Title 12
In this Administrative State the Alaska Rules of Court on "Criminal Rules"(APA regulations) have the "force and effect of law" and takes precedence over the Code of Criminal Procedure that is purportedly enacted into Code by the Legislature of the State! See Price v. State, 647 P.2d 611 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Applied in Hansel v. State, 604 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1979); Quoted in Speas v. State, 511 P.2d 130 (Alaska 1973); and cited in Constantine v. State, 739 P.2d 188 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
This has the meaning that all of the legislative acts in CAS 12 et sea. on Criminal Procedure (sic) are subordinate to the Criminal Rules that have the "force and effect of law", i.e. regulations under the APA (Alaska) definition of "regulation" under AS 44.62.640(a)(3) states in part, to wit:
(3)"regulation" means every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or revision of a rule, regulation, order, or standard adopted by a state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it .. . [Emphasis added]
As the Alaska Rules of Court in both the Civil and Criminal are rules, i.e. regulations under the APA (Alaska). This is conclusive evidence that all of the courts open today in Alaska are nothing but APA (Alaska) Administrative Courts under the final control of the Alaska Bar Association members ("ABAM"), as all of the administrative judges are all bar members. These ABAM do by Supreme Court Order ("SCO") i.e. a "regulation" under the APA, create or change the "Criminal Rules" by SCO that have the "force and effect of law." Of course the Legislature of the State does also change Civil Rules (regulations) or Criminal Rules (regulations) by Temporary and Special Acts (private law) too numerous to list, but they are all public records!
Are the Criminal Rules (SCO's) given Public Notice
The Criminal Rules (regulations that have the force and effect of law) are not published for public comment, but are edicts from the Alaska Bar members, Le. SCO's, made a public record in the Alaska Rules of Court for the administrative courts in the administrative state.
Assistance of Counsel is a Criminal Rule (Regulation) by SCO ONLY!
The legislative jurisdiction of the Assistance of Counsel secured in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and in the Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated ("ACLA") of 1949 in Title 66 et seq. is now a rule (regulation) of court in criminal rule 5 by SCO with only a minor amendment by the legislature by temporary and special act of 86 SLA 1998. An "attorney" only, not Assistance of Counsel (Counsellor-at-law), is allowed access to a prisoner in CAS 12.25.150 with the APA(Alaska) regulations in 22 AAC 05.015, 22 AAC 05.130, 22 AAC 05.545, and 22 AAC 05.595 and bail is in CAS 12.30.010 with no AAC's (regulations). One must remember that the Criminal Rules (regulations) having the "force and effect of law" take precedence over the AS Criminal Code of Procedure in Title 12.
Court or Employee of a Court is a "criminal justice agency" and is an "agency"!
In CAS 12.62.900(1), "agency" means a criminal justice agency. Then in CAS 12.62.900(11) a "criminal justice agency" (A) means a court with criminal jurisdiction or an employee of that court; . . . CAS 12.62.900(1) has no regulation, but C12.62.900(11) does.
To comply with APA on these definitions and many more damning definitions, this is in 13 AAC 85.900 completing the loop of the statute and regulation. Parts of these definitions of regulations are used 4 AAC 62.210 (qualifications and responsibilities of individuals having contact with children in a child care facility); 4 AAC 65.327 (Child care in the child's own home); 7 AAC 50.210 (Qualifications and responsibilities of persons having regular contact with children in a facility); 7 AAC 56.210 (Qualifications and responsibilities of individuals having regular contact with children and clients in an agency); 12 AAC 44.990 (Nursing definitions); 13 AAC 68.905 (Information definitions); and 13 AAC 85.900 (Public Safety part 6 Alaska Police Standards Council Chapter 85. Minimum Standards for Police, Probation, Parole, Correctional, and Municipal Correctional Officers Article 3. General Provisions 13 AAC 85.900).
"Criminal Justice Activity" (Regulation) is Investigation, Prosecution, and Adjudication
Criminal justice activity in © AS 12.62.900 is defined to mean, to wit:
(10) "criminal justice activity" means
(A) investigation, identification, apprehension, detention, pretrial or post-trial release, prosecution, adjudication, or correctional supervision or rehabilitation of a person accused or convicted of a crime;
(B) collection, storage, transmission, and release of criminal justice information; or
(C) the employment of personnel engaged in activities described in (A) or (B) of this paragraph; [Emphasis added]
All of the police investigations, apprehension and detention; the courts detention, prosecution and adjudication; and other personnel are part of the APA (Alaska) the regulations. To comply with the APA of ©44.62 et seq. for both a statute and regulation, this is in the AAC's in regulation 13 AAC 68.905(14). Unbelievable!
Criminal Rule (Regulation) 16 Protects the Administrative State
The Alaska Rules of Court in the Criminal Rules (regulations) is the protection scheme by the Alaska Bar Members implemented by SCO is the following, to wit:
(a) Scope of Discovery. In order to provide adequate information for informed pleas, expedite trial, minimize surprise, afford opportunity for effective cross-examination, and meet the requirements of due process, discovery prior to trial should be as full and free as possible consistent with protection of persons, effective law enforcement, and the adversary system. [Emphasis added]
Protecting the persons includes the "STATE OF ALASKA", as the courts have determined same. See Notes to Decisions under CAS 01.10.060, i.e. Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) and many other cases.
Protecting the "effective law enforcement" means all of the police and troopers with their associated agencies. Protecting the adversary system includes all of the courts, judges, magistrates, prosecutors, clerks, and attorneys.
This means that there is no Trial by Jury available today in the territorial boundaries of Alaska. This also means that inculpatory and exculpatory evidence that should be presented to a jury of my peers can and will be withheld to protect the persons, effective law enforcement, and the adversary system. This also is unconstitutional.
As held in the adjudged decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 281 (1999), to wit:
In Brady this Court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or [***33] bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 US. at 87. We have since held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, United States v. Agars, 427 US. 97, 107, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976), and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 US. 667, 676, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). Such evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US. 419, 433-434, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence "known only to police [*281] investigators and not to the prosecutor." Id. at 438. In order to comply with Brady, therefore, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. [Emphasis added]
What is Treason and Levying War?
In the adjudged decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 126, 127, 128 (1807) the requirements for levying war and treason were held to be the following, to wit:
As there is no crime which can more excite and agitate the passions of men than treason, no charge demands more from the tribunal before which it is made a deliberate and temperate inquiry. Whether this inquiry be directed to the fact or to the law, none can be more solemn, none more important to the citizen or to the government; none can more affect the safety of both.
To prevent the possibility of those calamities which result from the extension of treason to offences of minor *126 importance, that great fundamental law which defines and limits the various departments of our government has given a rule on the subject both to the legislature and the courts of America, which neither can be permitted to transcend.
'Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.'
To constitute that specific crime for which the prisoners now before the court have been committed, war must be actually levied against the United States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, the distinct offences. The first must be brought into operation by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. So far has this principle been carried, that, in a case reported by Ventris, and mentioned in some modern treatises on criminal law, it has been determined that the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to levying war. It is true that in that case the soldiers enlisted were to serve without the realm, but they were enlisted within it, and if the enlistment for a treasonable purpose could amount to levying war, then war had been actually levied.
It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his county. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of affecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men for the treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.
Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those *127 institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our constitution, who not only defined and limited the crime, but with jealous circumspection attempted to protect their limitation by providing that no person should be convicted of it, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court, must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring into operation. It is therefore more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide.
To complete the crime of levying war against the United States, there must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing a treasonable design. In the case now before the court, a design to overturn the government of the United States in New-Orleans by force, would have been unquestionably a design which, if carried into execution, would have been treason, and the assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of carrying it into execution would amount to levying of war against the United States; but no conspiracy for this object, no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war.
In conformity with the principles now laid down, have been the decisions heretofore made by the judges of the United States.*128
The opinions given by Judge Paterson and Judge Iredell, in cases before them, imply an actual assembling of men, though they rather designed to remark on the purpose to which the force was to be applied than on the nature of the force itself. Their opinions, however, contemplate the actual employment of force.
Judge Chase, in the trial of Fries, was more explicit.
He stated the opinion of the court to be, 'that if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of any statute of the United States by force, they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor; but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by force, that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed, neither lessens nor increases the crime: whether by one hundred, or one thousand persons, is wholly immaterial.' 'The court are of opinion,' continued Judge Chase, on that occasion, 'that a combination or conspiracy to levy war against the United States is not treason, unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into execution; some actual force or violence must be used in pursuance of such design to levy war; but it is altogether immaterial whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object; any force connected with the intention will constitute the crime of levying war.' [Emphasis added]
To levy war there must be the following, to wit:
1. An assemblage of men for the purpose of treasonable design in of resisting or opposing the execution of any statute or constitutional secured right of the United States by overturning the government of the United States; and,
2. It is carried into execution by force; then they are guilty of treason of levying war; and,
3. The quantum of the force employed neither lessens nor increases the crime as long as there is an assemblage of men; and,
4. It is immaterial whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object and any force connected with the intention will constitute the crime of levying war.
Do the Actions of the Police Officers and other Constitute Levying War and Treason
In each of the citations issued listed on the DMV Letter, there were more than one police officer under arms, so the requirement of an assemblage of men is met, not to mention that these police officers assemble at their headquarters for the implementation and instruction of the APD version of the Use of Force Continuum used by the Alaska State Troopers, known as Response Resistance from what I have been able to determine.
The use of force of in each of the citations issued on the DMV letter is also met, as the Alaska State Troopers "Use of Force Continuum" clearly establishes that force means "[Restraint for the purpose of gaining control of a person" in 107.020(1).
In 107.020(C)(4), just the presence of the officer is "force" and it is escalated until the objective of the gaining control is achieved by the officer up to and included deadly force, to wit:
should keep in mind that the proper officer response can be thought of as a continuum that includes several stages (from lowest to highest): officer presence, verbal persuasion, directions, and commands; "soft" empty hand control and OC spray; OC projectiles; "hard" empty hand control, electronic weapons and batons; and deadly force. The appropriate amount of force to be used must be based upon the combination of many factors, such as the subject's age, size, sex, ability to escalate his use of force, skill level, and background; the officer's age, size, sex, training, immediate physical condition (injuries, exhaustion); and the surrounding physical and social environment.
The police officers achieve the use of deadly force by statements in gaining control of a person by statements such as, I am in fear of my life or similar statements. See 107.020 and in particular (D), to wit:
D. Additional requirement for use of deadly force. The Department, recognizing the integrity of human life, authorizes officers to use deadly force against another person only when, in addition to complying with the general policies regarding use of force, the officer has no other reasonable and practical alternative, and reasonably believes deadly force is necessary
1. to save his or her own life or the life of another;
2. to prevent serious physical injury [Ref. AS 11.81.900 (51)] to the officer or another; or
3. because there is probable cause to believe the person has committed a felony using deadly force against another, and will immediately endanger life. [Emphasis added]
I have attempted to obtain the copy of what I believe is called the response resistance used the APD that must be similar to the Use of Force Continuum used by the Alaska State Troopers. I e-mailed a letter to Denis LeBlanc on October 1, 2004. A Lt. Paul Honeman (Badge # 816) has promised many times to supply what I had requested in the Denis LeBlanc Letter, but has stalled for almost one month and now he will not even return my calls. I have attached a true copy of said letter to Denis LeBlanc ("Denis LeBlanc Letter"), being Attachment 1, to evidence my good faith intention to understand the police, their citations and who they really are, and the extremely bad faith of Denis LeBlanc and Lt. Paul Honeman.
Attempts to Obtain copies of the Original Citations, If they do Exist.
I have made several good faith efforts to obtain certified of the original citations. Lt Paul Honeman did on state firmly on September 30th, 2004 (video taped) at the APD headquarters that the original citations were in the Traffic Division in the Old Court House on third avenue.
I then proceeded with Carry Shortell and Tina Walker
Creating Rights to Bypass the Courts of Law
Congress is under no obligation to provide a remedy in the courts of the United States when it creates rights against the United States, and this is held in the adjudged decision of United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919), to wit:
[1][2] These general rules are well settled: (1) That the United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself, is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12, 32 L. Ed. 354; Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439, 21 L. Ed. 696; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195, 19 L. Ed. 35; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431, 433, 18 L. Ed. 700; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212, 7 L. Ed. 108. (2) That where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U. S. 165, 174, 175, 35 Sup. Ct. 398, 59 L. Ed. 520, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 118; Amson v. Murphy, 109 U. S. 238, 3 Sup. Ct. 184, 27 L. Ed. 920; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555, 558, 25 L. Ed. 212; Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 35, 23 L. Ed. 196. Still the fact that the right and the remedy are thus intertwined might not, if the provision stood alone, require us to hold that the remedy expressly given excludes a right of review by the Court of Claims, where the decision of the special tribunal involved no disputed question of fact and the denial of compensation was rested wholly upon the construction of the act. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 198, 19 Sup. Ct. 503, 43 L. Ed. 779; Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U. S. 124, 29 Sup. Ct. 556, 53 L. Ed. 936; McLean v. United States, 226 U. S. 374, 33 Sup. Ct. 122, 57 L. Ed. 260; United States v. Laughlin (No. 200), 249 U. S. 440, 39 Sup. Ct. 340, 63 L. Ed. 696, decided April 14, 1919. But here Congress has provided:
'That any claim which shall be presented and acted on under authority of this act shall be held as finally determined, and shall never thereafter be reopened or considered.'
These words express clearly the intention to confer upon the Treasury Department exclusive jurisdiction and to make its decision final. The case of United States v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 268, 13 Sup. Ct. 327, 37 L. Ed. 164, strongly relied upon by claimants, has no application. Compare D. M. Ferry & Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. 550, 557, 29 C. C. A. 345. [Emphasis added]
The adjudged decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919) must be examined to determine the particular issues that Congress can bypass the courts of the United States, otherwise it is clearly self-evident that the "Separation of Powers", the Constitutional Republic, and the judicial Power of the United States arising in Article III of the Constitution of the United States under the authority of the United States in Law and Equity would be nonexistent, thereby abrogation in total of the Constitution of the United States where the people of the United States have granted a limited delegation of Power to Congress.
In the adjudged decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1888), this was a case of Oscar Dunlap, a veteran, attempting to have a mandamus issued against Mr. Black, a commissioner of pensions to increase his pension. The Secretary of the Interior was the appellate tribunal exercising discretion, and the Secretary had rendered a decision to change and increase the pension of Dunlap. As Black refused, and as the Secretary had no means to issue a mandamus, it was proper to resort to a judicial tribunal to compel Black to comply with the Secretary's judgment.
But in issues where the Congress has plenary power concerning the military, access to the courts of the United States can be denied.
In Ex parte Atocha, 84 U.S. 439 (1873) Alexander J. Atocha, a naturalized citizen of the United States, presented a claim against the government of Mexico for losses sustained by reason of his expulsion from that country in 1845. As this involved the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and under the treaty's stipulations claims are not brought within the cognizance of the Supreme Court of the United States, and when jurisdiction over such claims is conferred by special act, the authority of the Court of Claims to hear and determine them, and of the Supreme Court of the United States to review its action, is limited and controlled by the provisions of that act. Therefore, in issues of treaty stipulations, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States can be limited.
In the adjudged decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. 188 (1868), the legal representatives of George Fisher, deceased, importuned Congress for war reparations in the year of 1813 for property taken or destroyed by the troops of the United States and many years thereafter. Congress passed several special acts for Fisher's legal representative until a resolution June 1st, 1860 creating a special tribunal which was repealed in 1861. As this was within war reparations under the plenary power of Congress, Congress could deny or limit the access to courts of the United States by repealing said resolution.
In the adjudged decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. 419, De Groot had a contract with the United States to supply several million bricks, but some delay or difficulty was encountered in delivery. This was a private contract, and according to the terms contained therein, De Groot surrendered all property to the United States and received a settlement. Being dissatisfied with the award, De Groot petitioned Congress and a joint resolution authorized the Secretary of War to settle the claim. The Secretary proceeded to settle the claim, but Congress being dissatisfied with the award, repealed the special act and by act of Congress directed the claim to the Court of Claims. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Secretary's award, but the remedy was totally under the control of Congress as to whether any court access would be allowed in issues where the United States contracts with a private person.
In the adjudged decision of Comegys and Pettit v. Vasse, 26 U.S. 193, a complicated case involving bankruptcy, a treaty, and vessels captured of which Vasse was the underwriter on the vessels. All of these issues are in the plenary power of Congress, being uniform bankruptcy laws, treaties, and war reparations. Therefore, Congress can deny or limit access to the courts of the United States on how claims in these particular subjects can be adjudicated.
Now to use the 1040 Form for the federal taxes, there is a place for deductions in the Schedule A Itemized Deductions on line 6. But on the 1040 Form itself, line 7 is for "wages."
In the Code of Federal Regulations (hereafter "CFR') the following are the substantive regulations pertaining to wages under 26 U.S.C. § 3401 as required on the IRS 1040 Form starting with the substantive regulation of 26 CFR 1.1441-1 under the statutory authority of 26 USC § 1441(c)4) & § 3401(a)(6) and other substantive regulations using 26 U.S.C. § 3401 statutory authority as found in Treas Reg T 26, Ch I, Subch A. Pt. 1, to wit:
1. 26 CFR 1.1441-2 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4) & § 3401(a)(6); and,
2. 26 CFR 1.1441-3 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), § 3401(a)(6) &, § 7701(1); and,
3. 26 CFR 1.1441-4 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4) & § 3401(a)(6); and,
4. 26 CFR 1.1441-5 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), § 3401(a)(6), 7701(b)(11); and,
5. 26 CFR 1.1441-6 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), & § 3401(a)(6); and,
6. 26 CFR 1.1441-7 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp. Withholding Agent Defined - IMPORTANT] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), § 3401(a)(6) & 7701(1); and,
7. 26 CFR 1.1461-1 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), & § 3401(a)(6); and,
8. 26 CFR 1.1461-2 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), § 3401(a)(6), & 7701(1); and,
9. 26 CFR 1.1462-1 [Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corp.] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), § 3401(a)(6), & 7701(1).
In Treas Reg T 26, Ch I, Subch C. Pt. 31, we find one more substantive regulation under § 3401, being 26 CFR 31.3401(a)(6)-1 [Collection of Income at the Source Nonresident Aliens Individuals -IMPORTANT] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), & § 3401(a)(6).
There are two more substantive regulations, with the first one in 26 CFR 301.7605 [Discovery of Liability & Enforcement of Title Examination and Inspection still nonresident aliens and foreign corporations though] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), § 3401(a)(6) and 7701(1) and the second one in 26 CFR 301.7701-16 [Definition of Withholding Agent See 1.1441-7(a)] 26 USC § 1441(c)4), § 3401(a)(6) and 7701(1).
It is clearly self-evident that to have application of wages pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3401, I would have to be nonresident Alien, or a foreign corporation. I am neither a nonresident Alien or acting in any capacity as a foreign corporation.
Law of the Land
As held in the adjudged decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 350, 368, 369 (1873), to wit:
It is a rule as old as the law, and never more to be respected than now, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court, by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and *369 has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and never can be upheld where justice is justly administered. [Emphasis added]
Beverly W. Cutler Admits to Being an Administrative Judge
As evidenced by the admission of Beverly W. Cutler (hereafter "Cutler") being only an administrative judge on "CIV-210 PALMER SUP(9/96)(st.3) JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENT ORDER and Cutler has no Civil Commission, and has no Oath of Office as a public Officer of the State of Alaska. An administrative act of Cutler is not a judicial act.
In the adjudged decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 473 (1890) that acts by administrative officers, be they in a body called a court or other judicial tribunal is not a true judicial Act and can not be reviewed in an appellate court possessing judicial Powers only.
Should Cutler proceed absent any means to affect the judicial Power of a true Court of Law, then an Injunction in the District Court of the United States would be the only remedy available, which will be pursued. See Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 473 et seq. (1890).
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