America's Top 20 Facts of (Law)

Believe it or Not

1. The IRS is not a U.S. Government Agency. It is an Agency of the IMF (Diversified metal Products v. IRS etal. CV-93-405E-EJE U.S.D.C.D.I ., Public Law 94-564, Senate Report 94-1148 pg. 5967, Reorganization Plan No. 26, Public Law 102-391.)

2. The IMF is an Agency of the UN. (Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. Pg 816)

3. The U.S. has not had a Treasury since 1921 (41 Stat. Ch. 214 pg. 654)

4. There are no judicial courts in America and there has not been since 1789. Judges do not enforce Statutes and Codes. Executive Administrators enforce Statutes and codes (FRC. V. GE 281 US 464, Keller v. PE 261 US 428, 1 Stat. 138-178) http:; llcaselaw._lp_ findlaw, comlscriptsl. getcae.pl? _court=us& _vol+261& invol+248

5. There have not been any Judges in America since 1789. There have just been Administrators. (FRC v. GE 281 US 464, Keller v PE 261 US 428 1Stat. 138-178)

6. New York City is defined in the Federal Regulations as the United Nations. Rudolph Giuliani stated on C-Span that " New York City was the capitol of the world" and he was correct. (20 CFR chapter 111, subpart B 422.103 (b) (2) (2) (also check out Rev. 14 in reference to what happened on 9/11)

7. You own no property, slaves can't own property. Read the Deed to the property that you think is yours. You are listed as a Tenant. (Senate Document 43, 73rd Congress 1 st. Session)

8. You cannot use the Constitution to defend yourself because you are not a party to it. (Padelford Fay & Co. v. The mayor and Alderman of the City of Savannah 14 Georgia 438, 520)

9. The King of England financially backed both sides of the Revolutionary war. (Treaty at Versailles July 15, 1782, Treat of Peace 8 Stat 80)

10. America is a British Colony. (THE UNITED STATES IS A CORPORATION, NOT A LAND MASS AND IT EXISTED BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND THE BRITISH TROOPS DID NOT LEAVE UNTIL 1796). Republican v. Sweers 1 Dallas 43, Treaty of Commerce 8 Stat 116, The society for Propagating the Gospel & c. v. New Haven 8 Wheat 464, Treaty of Peace 8 Stat 80, IRS Publication 6209, Articles of Association October 20, 1774 .

11. Britain is owed by the Vatican. (Treaty of 1213).

12. The Pope can abolish any law in the United States (elements of Ecclesiastical Law Vol. 1 53-54)

13. We are slaves and own absolutely, nothing not even what we think are our children (Tillman v. Roberts 108 So. 62, Van Koten v. Van Koten 154 N.E. 146, Senate Document 43 & 73rd Congress 1 Session, Wynehammer v. People 13 N.R. REP 378, 481)

14. "The People" does not include you and me. (Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore. 32 U.S. 243)

15. It is not the duty of the police to protect you. Their job is to protect the Corporation and arrest code breakers. Sappv. Tallahasse, 348 So. 2nd 363, Reiff v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F. Supp. 1262, Lynch v. N.C. Dept. of Justice 376 S.E. 2nd. 247.

16. Everything in the "United States" is for sale: roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, water, prisons, airports, etc. I wonder who bought Klamath Lake? Did anyone take the time to check? (?Executive Order 12803)

17. We are Human capital (Executive Order 13037)

18. The FCC, CIA, FBI, NASA and all of the other alphabet gangs were never a part of the United States government. Even though the "US government" held shares of stock in the various Agencies. ( U.S. v. Strang, 254 US 491, Lewis v. U.S. 680 F. 2d, 1239) http://ca_selaw. Ip.findlaw. Co m/scripts/.qetcase. pi?Court= us&vol=254& invol=491.

19. A 1040 form is for tribute paid to Britain . (IRS Publication 6209 IMF decoding manual)

20. We are enemies of the State (Trading with the Enemy Act 1933 Act of 1917 & 1933) Trading with the Enemy Act 1933 Act of 1917 & 1933 (People declared the Enemy) Oct. 6, 1917, under the Trading with the Enemy Act, Section 2 subdivision ( c ) Chapter 106 – Enemy defined "other than citizens of the United States…" March 9, 1933, Chapter 106, Section 5, subdivision (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411) amended as follows: "…any person within the United States." See H.R. 1491 Public No. 1.

We fear things in proportion to our ignorance of them.

What manner of PERSON are you?

Just exactly what is a person by legal definition? What is the legal authority of a person? Is a Christian a person? The answers to these questions have eluded Americans ever since the end of Lincoln 's Civil War and the general acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since all State statutes and every court in the United States , right down to the local municipal courts, define every American as a person, then we should find out just what this means so that we can understand what we are according to the civil governments and judges.

Law dictionaries are a necessary resource in defining any word used in the courts or civil governments. In our research, it's very odd that we found the 'not so obvious' while the 'obvious' was not there to be defined. For example, let's start with the definition for the word person:

PERSON : 1. "natural person ". 2. the body of a human being. also : the body and clothing of a human being. Example: had drugs on his person. 3. one (as a human being or corporation) that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties (see also: juridical person, legal   person, personality). --Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Law ©1996. [underlining added].

PERSON - In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though by statute term may include labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,   trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. See e.g. National Labor Relations Act, Partnership Act, §2. Scope and delineation of term is necessary for §2(1), 29 U.S.C.A. §152; Uniform determining those to whom Fourteenth Amendment of Constitution affords protection since this Amendment expressly applies to individual, partnership, and corporation, but not governmental unit. Bankrupt Code - "Person" includes organization. U.C.C. §1-201(30). Definition of "person" or U.S.C.A. §101; Commercial Law - An individual or "municipal utility operators suing as plaintiffs seeking damages persons" covered by anti-trust laws includes cities, whether as for antitrust violations or as operators being sued as defendants. City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., La., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1128, 55 L.Ed.2d 364. --Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, The West Group © 1999. [underlining added].

A person is defined here as various legal entities (ie. a corporation, association, city, partnership, etc.), a human being, an individual, or a natural person. The simplest term to understand is that of any legal entity, such as a corporation. Every legal entity is created by the state itself and under the exclusive authority of the state that created it. Something that may surprise most readers is the legal definition of an individual:

Individual. adj. 1. Existing as an indivisible entity. 2. Of or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group. --Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, The West Group© 1999. [underlining added].

At first, this seems like double-talk, but it's not. An individual is a single legal entity as opposed to a corporate entity (made of members who comprise a singular group). None-the-less, a legal entity is simply a legal entity. In reality, the definitions are telling us that an individual is a legal entity, a fiction of "law", with the same legal structure and authority as a corporation, but with only one singular "member". If a flesh and blood man appears before a court answering that he is an individual, he has agreed and stated that he is a legal entity. Here's further explanation:

Entity. An organization (such as a business or a governmental unit) that has a legal identity apart from its members. --Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, The West Group © 1999.

This pretty much groups together corporations, cities, associations, individuals, etc. as legally created separate entity persons. Next, let's see what a natural person is as shown in the above definitions.

NATURAL PERSON : a human being as distinguished from a person (as a corporation)  created by operation of law. --Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Law ©1996. [underlining added].

From this definition, there is the distinction that a natural person is not a person created by state law (a legal entity). A natural person is defined here as a human being. Although a human being is not defined as a corporation, both are defined as being a person.

LEGAL PERSON : a body of persons or an entity (as a corporation) considered as having many of the rights and responsibilities of a natural person and esp. the capacity to sue and be sued. --Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Law ©1996. [underlining added].

ARTIFICIAL PERSON : "legal person" --Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Law ©1996. [underlining added].

This helps us further understand that by following these definitions, a human being - a natural person -apparently is not defined as a legal person or an artificial person. So, it appears that a person is comprised of two distinct groups:

a human being - natural person (not created by state or civil "law").

a legal - artificial person (specifically created by state or civil "law". A legal entity).

What is a human being a.k.a. natural person?

Just exactly what is a human being or a natural person? There are no listed definitions for "human", "being", or "human being" in Black's or in Webster's law dictionaries. We even looked them up in Oran's Dictionary of the Law published by The West Group © 2000, and they weren't defined there either. Isn't it extremely odd that the same law dictionaries which define a person as a human being don't define any of the words used within their own definition? If we were to stop right here, then according to the most recent and authoritative law dictionaries available, we have no legal definition of a human being and, therefore, do not know what a natural person is. Since the "law" of the United States is supposed to be so specific and exact, how can this be?

In order to find the legal definition, we had to dig deeper. Each current collegiate and standard desktop dictionary we looked into all had definitions for the word human. Only the law dictionaries were void of these word definitions. Here is a definitive example that was mirrored nearly word for word in the other dictionaries, including medical reference dictionaries:

Human - noun, circa 1533 : a bipedal primate mammal (Homo sapiens) : MAN; broadly: any living or extinct member of the family (Hominidae) to which the primate belongs. -- Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, New World Edition 1998.

This seems somewhat clear. A human is a MAN. A MAN is a bipedal (walks on two legs) primate mammal. A primate is the highest order of mammals. It includes man, together with the apes and monkeys.

Primate : any of an order (Primates) of mammals comprising humans, apes, monkeys, and related forms (as lemurs and tarsiers) --Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, New World Edition 1998 [underlining added].

It seems logical to conclude that a human being is scientifically defined as the top group of the species of two legged mammals. But what has this to do with the current American "law" or the legal defining of a person? The key that ties the scientific and legal definitions together is the word MAN or mankind. The following definitions are from Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, The West Group © 1999 [underlining added]:

Man. 1. An adult male. 2. Humankind. - Also termed mankind. 3. A human being. 4. Hist, A vassal; a feudal tenant.

Mankind. See MAN (2).

Vassal. noun. [Law Latin vassallus] Hist, The grantee of a fief, feud, or fee; a feudal tenant. Cf. FREEMAN.

Vassalus. noun, [Law Latin] Hist. A feudal tenant.

Freeman. 1. A person who possesses and enjoys all the civil and political rights belonging to the people under a free government. 2. A person who is not a slave. 3. Hist. A member of a municipal corporation (a city or borough) who possesses full civic rights, esp. the right to vote. 4. Hist. A freeholder. 5. Hist. An allodial landowner. Cf. VASSAL.

Now we're able to tie things together within the authoritative law dictionaries. According to the legal definitions shown above, a person is: 1. a human being, 2. a MAN, 3. mankind, 4. a feudal tenant, 5. a member (individual part) of a corporation. Also note that a person enjoys the rights of the people. These words are not the same. The plural of person is persons, not people. Notice how most of the definitive words and phrases immediately above are also found in the law dictionary definitions of person at the beginning of this article. Compare them all and see that they are the same. Let what is written and recognized speak for itself.

Feudal tenancy?

This all seems to fit quite well with the law dictionary definitions of a person. But now, we also have the added definitive fact that a human being - a person - is a feudal tenant. This defines a specific element of a person that appears to have been hidden from the law dictionaries by their own exclusion when defining a human being - person. A feudal tenant is a term from the English Feudal Law of land ownership and tenancy.

Feud. n. Hist. 1. An inheritable estate in land conveyed from a feudal superior to a grantee or tenant, held on the condition of rendering services to the superior. 2. An interest [not ownership] of the tenant in the land conveyed. 3. The land itself conveyed. - Also termed (in 1, 2, & 3) fee; fief; feod; feude; feudum. --Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, New World Edition 1998 [underlining and bracketed notes added].

A human being is the tenant to a feudal superior. A feudal tenant is a person who pays rent or services of some sort for the use and occupaton of another's land. The land has been conveyed to the tenant's use, but the actual ownership remains with the superior. Since this applies to modern "law" in America , the implications of fact cannot be ignored. If a person does not own what he thought was his land (he's legally defined as a feudal tenant, not the superior owner), then a superior person owns the land and the feudal tenant - person pays him to occupy the land.

Welcome to your introduction of the hidden Feudal Law in America. When a person ( a.k.a. human being, corporation, natural person, partnership, association, organization, etc.) pays taxes to the tax assessor of the civil county or city government (also a person), it is a payment to the superior land owner for the right to be a tenant and to occupy the land belonging to the superior. If this were not so, then how could a local government sell the house and land of a person for not rendering his services (taxes)?

We used to think that there was no possible way Feudal Law could be exercised as "law" in America, but since 1865, the facts have proven otherwise. Now, the modern law dictionaries are telling us that we're correct in our assumption of the facts. It's no wonder they hid the definition of a human being behind the definition of a man. The next time you enter into an agreement or contract with another person (a legal entity), look for the keywords person, individual, and natural person describing who you are. Are you the entity the other person claims you are? When you "appear" before their jurisdiction and courts, you have agreed that you are a person unless you show them otherwise. You will have to deny that you are the person and state who you really are. Is the flesh and blood standing there in that court room a person by their legal definition?

The Christian Man vs. a legal person

If you're a Christian, are you also a person?

Man was created by the immediate hand of God and is generically different from all other creatures --Genesis 1:26, 27 and 2:7.

Man was created in the likeness of God and the perfection of His nature in knowledge -- Col. 3:10.

Man was created in His righteousness and holiness --Ephesians 4:24.

Man was created with dominion over all the inferior creatures --Genesis 1:28.

God created man in His own Divine image --Genesis 1:27.

Is this Man God created the same as the legalistic MAN who is defined in our present law dictionaries as a human being, a natural person?

The legal terms human being and natural person are not found in the Bible. They are not created by God. They are legal titles for entities created by a "law" which is not the Law of God, the Lex Ecclesia.

"And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. --Genesis 2:7.

It was the breath of God Himself that gave Man -Hebrew, Adam- Divine inspiration, a soul, and spirit life. Why are the words inspiration, soul, spirit and life not within the current legal definitions of MAN?

Because the legalistic "law" now prevailing in America does not recognize the Law of God and does not recognize that Man is Divine life. If the corporate and governmental persons were to recognize the superior and allodial authority of the Lord God, they would have to admit that the Law of God was superior to their "laws" - mere legalisms. How could they collect their feudal tenant servitude from the Christians who occupy God's land since the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof?

Legally, MAN is a superior creature and nothing more. Their legal definitions say so. Lawfully, Man is a spritual creation in and of God's image, separate and distinct from the other animals. Man was created by and has inherent life from the Lord's breath -Hebrew, n^eshâwmâh-, but a MAN is created by the civil laws of an entity and owes it's existence to a mere legal person who creates more legal persons. Whereby, the Man of God's image has life, but a MAN has no life outside of the legal realm that created it.

How do you choose to call yourself now that you know the truth?

Cases Key in procedural law

Alabama v. White 496 U.S. 325 (1990) - extends the totality of circumstances test (see Illinois v. Gates) in reasonable suspicion to detain cases, such as those involving an anonymous tip.

Arizona v. Evans 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) - allows exception to exclusionary rule if police are acting in good faith on a search warrant that is later declared invalid due to clerical error.

Barker v. Wingo 407 U.S. 514 (1972) - allows exceptions to 90-day speedy trial requirement based on balancing test to be used on ad hoc basis.

Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41 (1967) - statutes authorizing electronic eavesdropping warrants must require more precise information than that required in regular search warrants, and orders must not be for more than two months.

Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963) - allows defense counsel to ask for "all Brady material" or anything exculpatory as part of discovery process.

Brewer v. Williams 430 U.S. 387 (1977) - Even at post-arraignment stage (during transport, for example), indirect questioning without benefit of counsel can yield admissible, incriminating statements.

Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543 (1968) - evidence obtained by police who claim they have a warrant when in fact they do not is inadmissible; lower courts are divided on the issue of consent if police threaten they can easily obtain a warrant.

Burch v. Louisiana 441 U.S. 130 (1979) - allows nonunanimous jury verdicts for 12-member juries, but when jury size reduced to six, verdict must be unanimous.

California v. Acevedo 500 U.S. 565 (1991) - rules that closed container (Chadwick -Sanders) rule does not apply in vehicle stops where there is probably cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence.

California v. Greenwood 486 U.S. 35 (1988) - widely-cited case allowing warrantless searches of items placed out on curb for trash collection to find evidence of criminal activity.

California v. Prysock 453 U.S. 355 (1981) - Miranda warnings don't have to be given in their precise wording (talismanic incantation) as long as a fully effective equivalent conveying the intended content is there.

Carroll v. U.S. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) - old, "bootlegging" case (the Carroll doctrine) which allows warrantless search of integral areas of vehicle (including upholstery) based on probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime (also see U.S. v. Chadwick and California v. Acevedo).

*CBS, Inc. v. Cobb 536 S. 2d 1067 (1988) - requires reporters to reveal their sources.

Chimel v. California 395 U.S. 752 (1969) - authorizes the landmark "Chimel rule": police may search the area within a person's immediate control (arm's reach) incidental to an arrest. The justification for the search is the arrest. Anything seized does not have to be related to the crime arrested for. Colorado v. Spring 479 U.S. 564 (1987) - interrogations where the defendant thinks they are being charged with a more minor crime is allowed.

Connecticut v. Barrett 479 U.S. 523 (1987) - an oral confession is admissible even if the suspect refuses to sign a written statement on advice of their attorney.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin 500 U.S. 413 - covers cases where preliminary hearing and arraignment are combined by state law (causing paperwork delays). Establishes 48 hour rule interpretation of "promptness" in Gerstein. After that, burden of delay shifts to the state.

Duckworth v. Eagan 492 U.S. 195 (1989) - the Miranda warnings need not be given in exact form; regarding the right to an attorney, the phrase "if and when you go to court" is sufficient. No need that attorneys be producible on call.

Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104 (1982) - no restrictions are allowed on the number of mitigating factors that defense may introduce for consideration by judge and/or jury.

Edwards v. Arizona 451 U.S. 477 (1981) - a suspect who invokes their Miranda rights by demanding an attorney cannot be interrogated further until a lawyer is made available.

Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478 (1964) - for any serious offense, a suspect is entitled to a lawyer during interrogation at a police station.

Florida v. Riley 488 U.S. 445 (1989) - establishes lower limit of 400 feet for navigable airspace in allowing aerial surveillance and photography.

Frisbie v. Collins 342 U.S. 519 (1952) - an unlawful arrest does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to try a criminal case.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778 (1973) - requires two-tier process in probation revocation hearings (preliminary and final), also benefit of counsel if charges are contested or substantial reasons defendant needs assistance.

Gernstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103 (1975) - Persons arrested without a warrant must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause (preliminary hearing); leaves it to individual states to integrate prompt PC hearings into pre-trial procedures (see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin).

Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963) - reverses Betts v. Brady (1942). Requires a lawyer be appointed for any indigent (poor) person who is charged with a felony or else person cannot be tried for the felony.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989) - use of force case which distinguished subjective (from perspective of officer at the scene) from objective (hindsight) standards in tests of reasonableness, allows civil suit claims if objectively unreasonable.

Hampton v. U.S. 425 U.S. 484 (1976) - there is no entrapment if a police informant supplies drugs to a suspect who is already predisposed to commit the crime.

Hoffa v. U.S. 385 U.S. 293 (1966) - also known as the "Test Fleet" case, allows state to intentionally plant an informant in the suspect's company.

Horton v. California 496 U.S. 128 (1990) - key case involving the "plain view" doctrine. Warrantless seizure allowed if item(s) in plain view, their incriminating character immediately apparent, and officer did not violate 4th Amendment in arriving at place from which evidence could be viewed (inadvertent discovery).

Illinois v. Allen 397 U.S. 337 (1970) - a disruptive defendant may be removed from the courtroom and trial may continue without their presence.

Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213 (1983) - the two-pronged (Aguilar) test for probable cause established in Spinelli v. U.S. (1969) is abandoned in favor of a "totality of circumstances" test.

Illinois v. Rodriguez 497 U.S. 177 (1990) - searches in which any person having "apparent authority" over an area gives consent are valid.

Illinois v. Vitale 447 U.S. 410 (1980) - allows exception to double jeopardy clause of 5th Amendment in conviction on more serious offense if guilty plea already accepted for a lesser offense, as long as all elements of lesser offense not included in greater offense.

Jacobson v. U.S. 503 U.S. 540 (1993) - updates the Sherman rule (Sherman v. U.S. 1958) on entrapment; entrapment occurs when agents originate a criminal design, implant a disposition to commit the act in an innocent person's mind, and then induce commission of the act in order to prosecute.

Johnson v. Avery 393 U.S. 483 (1969) - Absent other forms of legal assistance, prisons cannot prohibit "jailhouse lawyers" from assisting other inmates.

Katz v. U.S. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) - established "reasonable expectation of privacy" test which overturned Olmstead v. U.S. (1928) which restricted electronic surveillance by trespass rule. Both subjective (person's efforts to protect their privacy) and objective (privacy right society is willing to protect) expectations must be considered.

Kirby v. Illinois 406 U.S. 682 (1972) - a person has no right to counsel at pre-indictment identification procedures (they have not been formally charged with a crime).

Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961) -extends the exclusionary rule established in Weeks v. U.S. (1914) to state officials, evidence seized illegally is not admissible.

Maryland v. Buie 494 U.S. 325 (1990) - authorizes a protective "sweep search" in a person's home during an arrest.

Maryland v. Craig 497 U.S. 836 (1990) - one-way, closed-circuit television may be used to allow testimony (as in case of child witness) and does not violate defendant's right to confrontation, as long as other procedural safeguards are maintained.

Maynard v. Cartwright 486 U.S. 356 (1988) - prohibits vague statutory language such as "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" in capital-murder cases.

Michigan v. Harvey 494 U.S. 344 (1990) - reaffirms "prophylactic rule", that police-initiated conversations in absence of attorney may only be used to impeach conflicting testimony and cannot be used in the prosecutions case-in-chief.

Michigan v. Mosley 423 U.S. 96 (1975) - allows police to initiate another, sequential interrogation after suspect has invoked the right to remain silent as long as the right to cut off questioning is scrupulously honored.

Michigan v. Summers 452 U.S. 692 (1981) - police have the right to detain somebody while a search warrant is being executed.

Michigan State Police v. Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990) - police can establish (sobriety) checkpoints and systematically stop every x number of vehicles without reasonable suspicion.

Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973) - created Miller standard (prurient interest) for obscenity, overturning older standard (without redeeming social value).

Mincey v. Arizona 437 U.S. 385 (1978) - overturns state-level "murder scene exceptions" allowing warrantless searches at homicide scenes. Allows limited "victim or suspect" searches for anything in plain view.

Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) - results of a police interrogation are not admissible unless suspect is given Miranda warnings and there is a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver (but see North Carolina v. Butler and other cases).

Neil v. Biggers 409 U.S. 188 (1972) - established the five factors of eyewitness reliability (opportunity, attention, accuracy of prior description, certainty, and length of time); showups do not violate due process if, based on totality of circumstances, victim is able to make a reliable identification; together with Manson v. Brathwaite of 1977 established the Biggers-Brathwaite rule which means that even if police do something to jeopardize fairness or impartiality, a reliable eyewitness identification would still hold.

New York v. P.J. Video 475 U.S. 868 (1986) - obscenity case consolidating restrictions on exigency exceptions (Roaden v. Kentucky), requiring pre-trial adversary hearing (A Quantity of Books v. Kansas), requiring post-seizure obscenity hearing (Heller v. New York), and supporting affidavits (Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia).

North Carolina v. Butler 441 U.S. 369 (1979) - waiver of Miranda can be inferred from suspect's conduct and non-verbal body language.

O'Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987) - a workplace privacy case establishing the "reasonableness under all circumstances" test: both inception and scope of an intrusion must be reasonable.

Oliver v. U.S. 466 U.S. (1984) - trespass case allowing police to enter and search unoccupied or undeveloped areas outside of a dwelling's "curtilage" without either a warrant or probable cause.

Patterson v. Illinois 487 U.S. 285 (1988) - a waiver of Miranda constitutes a waiver of the right to counsel as well as the privilege against self-incrimination.

Pennsylvania v. Finley 481 U.S. 551 (1987) - defendants have no right to appointed counsel when seeking post-conviction relief.

Pennsylvania v. Muniz 496 U.S. 582 (1990) - videotape evidence of a suspect, such as a stop for driving while intoxicated, may be obtained without Miranda warnings.

Powers v. Ohio 499 U.S. 400 (1991) - peremptory challenges to exclude jurors cannot be based on race, regardless of race of defendant.

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union 521 U.S. (1997) - attempts to restrict exposure of minors to obscene material on the Internet violates the 1st Amendment.

Rhode Island v. Innis 446 U.S. 291 (1980) - casual conversation between police officers and suspects constitutes a "dialogue" and requires no Miranda warnings.

Ristanino v. Ross 424 U.S. 589 (1976) - prospective jurors during voir dire may be questioned regarding their racial prejudices only if facts of case are likely to inflame pre-existing racial prejudices.

Rochin v. California 342 U.S. 165 (1952) - landmark stomach-pumping case establishing "balancing test" where rights of individual against shocking and offensive intrusions are balanced against state's interests in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence.

Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757 (1966) - landmark blood-extracting case which established "threshold requirements" for invasive intrusions versus state's interests; commonplace medical practices involving no risk, trauma, or pain can be reasonably expected as part of state's interests.

Sheppard v. Maxwell 384 U.S. 333 (1966) - judge has duty to control case so that media publicity ("carnival atmosphere") does not interfere with right to fair trial.

Singer v. U.S. 380 U.S. 24 (1965) - defendants have no right to demand a bench trial if the prosecutor wants a jury trial; the ability to waive a jury trial is not of equal importance as the right to demand one.

Spinelli v. U.S. 393 U.S. 110 (1969) - concerns sufficiency of police affidavit in obtaining a search warrant. Requires informant tip to have veracity and basis of knowledge; adds reliability (overturned in Illinois v. Gates).

State v. Vejvoda 231 Neb 668 (1989) - judicial notice cannot invade jury's province of fact-finding.

Stoner v. California 376 U.S. 483 (1964) - a hotel clerk cannot give consent to search the room of a hotel guest. Hotel guests are no less entitled to protection than house owners.

Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984) - presents objective standards for effective representation by counsel; if undermined adversarial process, deficiencies were prejudicial, and attorney's conduct fell below prevailing professional norms.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985) - amends the old, common law "fleeing felon" rule. Deadly force cannot be used to prevent the escape of a suspect unless there is a significant threat of death or injury to the officer or others.

Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) - leading case establishing "stop and frisk" rule on reasonable suspicion. Police may temporarily detain someone for questioning if there are specific articulable facts which lead a reasonable police officer to believe that criminal activity is occurring.

U.S. v. Ash 413 U.S. 300 (1973) - no requirement of an attorney during post-indictment photographic lineups.

U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce 422 U.S. 873 (1975) - police cannot stop somebody merely because of their apparent ethnic ancestry or other single factor profiles.

U.S. v. Chadwick 433 U.S. 1 (1977) - this case, along with Arkansas v. Sanders 442 U.S. 753 (1979), established the Chadwick-Sanders rule which protects the privacy of closed containers in automobile searches. Overturned by California v. Acevedo.

U.S. v. Dunnigan 507 U.S. 87 (1993) - defendant's perjury at trial may be considered as grounds for increasing the sentence even when there has been no conviction for perjury.

U.S. v. Kelly 14 F3d 1169 (1994) - requires seals on evidence bags, establishes other procedures for proper chain of custody.

U.S. v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) - allows exception to exclusionary rule if police are acting in good faith on a search warrant that is later declared invalid, due to judicial error.

U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. 543 (1976) - Permanent, routine checkpoints for illegal aliens are allowed without suspicion.

U.S. v. Nelson 419 F2d 1237 (1969) - jury cannot convict on basis of inference from inference (circumstantial evidence alone).

U.S. v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1 (1989) - establishes drug courier profiling as grounds for reasonable suspicion.

U.S. v. Spivey 841 F2d 799 (1988) - right to cross-examine a hostile witness is not unlimited.

U.S. v. Wade 388 U.S. 218 (1967) - establishes the notion of a "critical" proceeding where the right to counsel attaches; together with Gilbert v. California of same year establish Wade-Gilbert rule where suspects cannot be put into a post-indictment lineup without notification and presence of an attorney.

Vernonia School District v. Acton 515 U.S. (1995) - allows random drug testing if school has a demonstrated drug problem.

Victor v. Nebraska 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) - involves proper instructions to a jury by a judge.

Warden v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294 (1967) - allows a warrantless search if probable cause and exigent circumstances are present, a "nexus"; "mere evidence" may be admitted.

Wilson v. Arkansas 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) - allows "no-knock" serving of a warrant if there are exigent circumstances (danger of violence, escape, or destruction of evidence). No blanket exception of "knock and announce" rule for

drug cases was established in Richards v. Wisconsin (1997).

Wisconsin v. Mitchell 508 U.S. 47 (1993) - longer sentences for crimes motivated by racial hatred do not violate the 1st Amendment.

Wong Sun v. U.S. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) - tied "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in with the exclusionary rule; any action following from an unconstitutional prior action (primary taint) is also inadmissible.

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 436 U.S. 547 (1978) - warrants can be issued to search newspaper premises.